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The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 To “confront” means an 
“opportunity for effective cross-examination.”2 At the very least, this 
requires trial judges to give defense counsel wide latitude to question 
accusers, but is freedom to question all that’s necessary for a chance at 
effective cross-examination? Or, do defendants also have a right to 
information necessary for effective cross-examination? If so, can the 
Confrontation Clause compel the discovery of such information? 
  
Last year in United States v. Arias the Eighth Circuit held that the 
Confrontation Clause can compel discovery to guarantee an opportunity 
for effective cross-examination.3 According to Judge Colloton’s dissent, the 
majority’s holding created a “stark conflict in the circuits.”4 The dissent, 
along with the other circuits, thinks that an opportunity for effective cross-
examination only means that the trial judge shall not impermissibly limit 
the scope of questioning.5 As long as the defense gets the chance to ask 
questions freely, the right to confrontation is satisfied. 
  
Since Crawford, most of the Supreme Court Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence has focused on what constitutes a “testimonial” statement,6 
but the Supreme Court has not recently addressed what constitutes an 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Saint Louis University School of Law 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
2 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) 
3 936 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir. 2019).  
4 Id. at 802 (Colloton, J., dissenting) 
5 Id.; see also United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 179 (3d. Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Sardinas, 386 F. App’x 927, 940–41 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hargrove, 382 F. 
App’x 765, 774–75 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 
2006); Isaac v. Grider, No. 98-6376, 2000 WL 571959, at *6–7 (6th Cir. 2000); Tapia v. 
Tansy, 926 F.2d 1554, 1559–60 (10th Cir. 1991). 
6 See, e.g., Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 244 (2015) (discussing post-Crawford Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence and the annunciation of the “primary purpose” test for 
determining whether evidence is testimonial). 
 




“opportunity for effective cross-examination.” Given the recent Eight 
Circuit ruling inaugurating a circuit split, clarification from the Supreme 
Court would be helpful. If the Court were to consider the issue, this article 
argues that it should follow the Arias majority and hold that the 
Confrontation Clause can compel discovery to guarantee an opportunity 
for effective cross-examination. 
  
 What happened in Arias? A jury convicted Arias of three counts of 
aggravated sexual abuse.7 K.P., the alleged victim, claimed that Arias 
sexually assaulted her in a hotel room during the weekend of his sister’s 
wedding.8 Before trial, the defense filed a motion to compel discovery of 
K.P’s mental health records, but the trial court denied the motion because 
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.9 At trial, K.P. testified that she was 
diagnosed with PTSD after the alleged assault.10 Defense counsel objected 
to this testimony on Confrontation Clause grounds, arguing that without 
K.P’s mental health records, the defendant was denied an opportunity to 
effectively cross-examine K.P. regarding her PTSD diagnosis.11 Without the 
records, Arias was unable to determine whether K.P. had been diagnosed 
with PTSD or whether the alleged sexual assault caused the diagnosis.12 
  
The majority agreed with defense counsel.13 Once K.P. testified regarding 
her PTSD diagnosis, “the Confrontation Clause became implicated, because 
if the PTSD testimony was allowed to be weighed by the jury, the defendant 
had a constitutionally protected opportunity for effective cross-
examination.”14 This reasoning implies that information is a relevant factor 
for determining whether an opportunity for effective cross-examination has 
been provided. When a jury hears an accuser’s testimony, but defense has 
been denied information necessary for a chance at effective cross-
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This resulted in Arias. On the basis of the Confrontation Clause, the court 
demanded that K.P. release her medical records for in camera review, so that 
the trial court could determine whether or not she was diagnosed with 
PTSD as a result of sexual assault.15 If she was diagnosed, then her 
testimony was likely harmless.16 If she was not diagnosed, or another event 
caused her diagnosis, a new trial may be necessary.17 Either way, what is 
striking about Arias is the fact that the court ordered the documents be 
produced on the basis of the Confrontation Clause. 
  
The dissent, however, disagreed with defense counsel.18 While the 
Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, it does not “compel discovery of information from a third 
party that might assist the defendant in cross-examining a witness.”19 There 
are generally two categories of Confrontation Clause cases: those involving 
the admission of out-of-court statements and those involving restrictions 
on the scope of cross-examination by law or by a trial judge.20 Here, neither 
is relevant because the K.P. testified at trial, so it’s not an out-of-court 
statement, and no law or trial judge restricted the scope of questioning.21 
The defense counsel was free to question K.P. about PTSD, and that is 
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.22 
  
But the dissent misses the fact that denying the defense information does 
limit questioning. A trial judge prohibiting a line of questioning is one way 
the scope of questioning can be limited, but it is not the only way. 
Restricting information that could be used for cross-examination also limits 
the scope of questioning. Justice Brennan put it this way: “A crucial avenue 
of cross-examination also may be foreclosed by the denial of access to 
material that would serve as a basis for this examination.”23 Although the 
defense knew that K.P. had mental health issues, the defense did not learn 
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about her PTSD diagnosis until she testified at trial.24 Without medical 
records, the defense did not know whether the diagnosis was true and was 
a result of the alleged assault. While the Defendant was still permitted to 
question K.P. regarding her PTSD testimony, the defense had little chance 
at effective cross-examination because it would be hard to know what line 
of questioning to pursue without the records. And if the medical records 
showed that K.P was not diagnosed with PTSD, or some other event caused 
her PTSD, then the defendant was denied a crucial opportunity to impeach 
his accuser regarding key testimony. 
  
This matters because the testimony implies that a medical professional 
believed K.P.’s claim about the assault, which may make the jury more 
willing to believe her too. Since the case was essentially one of conflicting 
testimony — Arias asserting his innocence and K.P alleging his guilt — 
credibility was crucial for determining the outcome, and the medical 
records were crucial for determining K.P’s credibility. And, because K.P. 
brought up her PTSD diagnosis, she waived her psychotherapist-patient 
privilege, so there was no reason left for denying Arias the records. 
Prohibiting access to the records, then, while allowing the jury to hear K.P’s 
testimony, denied Arias an opportunity for effective cross-examination. 
 
Therefore, the Arias majority was correct in holding that the Confrontation 
Clause can compel discovery in certain cases. To be sure, the holding is 
limited. The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee a right to pretrial 
discovery in general.25 But the clause does guarantee an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, and this was a case where such an opportunity 
depended on access to information. If defendants are denied access to 
information necessary to have a chance at effectively confronting an 
accuser’s trial testimony, the right to confrontation becomes a mere 
formality. In Crawford, Justice Scalia did much to revive the Confrontation 
Clause, following the Arias majority would revive it even more by ensuring 




Edited by Ben Davisson 
 
24 Appellant Reply Br. 6. 
25 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 999.  
